

USAWC STRATEGY RESEARCH PROJECT

**ARE OUR CURRENT DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE (DOD) STRATEGIES
SUFFICIENTLY FORWARD-LOOKING?**

by

Colonel Bobby L. Lipscomb
United States Army

Colonel Guy Maillet
Project Adviser

This SRP is submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements of the Master of Strategic Studies Degree. The U.S. Army War College is accredited by the Commission on Higher Education of the Middle States Association of Colleges and Schools, 3624 Market Street, Philadelphia, PA 19104, (215) 662-5606. The Commission on Higher Education is an institutional accrediting agency recognized by the U.S. Secretary of Education and the Council for Higher Education Accreditation.

The views expressed in this student academic research paper are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy or position of the Department of the Army, Department of Defense, or the U.S. Government.

U.S. Army War College
CARLISLE BARRACKS, PENNSYLVANIA 17013

Report Documentation Page

*Form Approved
OMB No. 0704-0188*

Public reporting burden for the collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instructions, searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing the collection of information. Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information, including suggestions for reducing this burden, to Washington Headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports, 1215 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington VA 22202-4302. Respondents should be aware that notwithstanding any other provision of law, no person shall be subject to a penalty for failing to comply with a collection of information if it does not display a currently valid OMB control number.

1. REPORT DATE 30 MAR 2007	2. REPORT TYPE Strategy Research Project	3. DATES COVERED 00-00-2006 to 00-00-2007						
4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE Are Our Current Department of Defense (DOD) Strategies Forward Looking?								
6. AUTHOR(S) Bobby Lipscomb								
7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) U.S. Army War College,Carlisle Barracks,Carlisle,PA,17013-5050								
9. SPONSORING/MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES)								
12. DISTRIBUTION/AVAILABILITY STATEMENT Approved for public release; distribution unlimited								
13. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES								
14. ABSTRACT See attached.								
15. SUBJECT TERMS								
16. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF: <table style="width: 100%; border-collapse: collapse;"> <tr> <td style="width: 33%;">a. REPORT unclassified</td> <td style="width: 33%;">b. ABSTRACT unclassified</td> <td style="width: 34%;">c. THIS PAGE unclassified</td> </tr> </table>			a. REPORT unclassified	b. ABSTRACT unclassified	c. THIS PAGE unclassified	17. LIMITATION OF ABSTRACT	18. NUMBER OF PAGES 22	19a. NAME OF RESPONSIBLE PERSON
a. REPORT unclassified	b. ABSTRACT unclassified	c. THIS PAGE unclassified						

ABSTRACT

AUTHOR: Colonel Bobby L. Lipscomb

TITLE: Are Our Current DOD Strategies Sufficiently Forward-Looking?

FORMAT: Strategy Research Project

DATE: 13 March 2007 WORD COUNT: 5766 PAGES: 22

KEY TERMS: World Changes, Future Conflicts, Future DOD Challenges

CLASSIFICATION: Unclassified

The Department of Defense (DOD) will continue to face many challenges in this volatile, uncertain, complex, and ambiguous world. We live in a rapidly changing world where terrorists and other non-state actors threaten our values and our way of life. One of the most important challenges facing DOD is developing a long-term strategy to keep pace with these world changes. These world changes include increased population growth and urbanization, rapid changes in technology, shortages of natural resources, increased capabilities of commercial and non-governmental agencies in supporting DOD, and the potential for increased conflict. As a result of these changes, DOD must develop long-term strategies that focus on improving urban warfare capabilities, developing alternate energy sources, adapting to changes in technology, enhancing the integration of commercial and non-governmental agencies while at the same time institutionalizing better controls over them, improving force structure, cultural awareness, and interagency operations, improving strategic decision making for junior officers and NCOs, and improving civil-military operations. This paper provides specifics on these changes and offers recommendations on what DOD must do to be a more relevant force in ensuring the security of our nation.

ARE OUR CURRENT DOD STRATEGIES SUFFICIENTLY FORWARD-LOOKING?

If you don't like change, you will like irrelevance even less.¹

—GEN Eric Shinseki
Former Chief of Staff of the Army

General Shinseki's words are more relevant today than at any other time in our nation's history. General Shinseki was convinced that if the Army did not embrace and adapt to change, it would become irrelevant and not be able to do its mission. This same logic applies to DOD. Without a truly long-term strategy to address the consequences of ongoing and future trends affecting operations, DOD will not be able to perform its mission of providing for our national security. Some of the major changes on the horizon include population growth in urban areas, shortage of natural resources, improvements in information and technology, stronger influence by commercial and non-governmental organizations in the security and defense arenas and an increase in world conflicts.² While DOD's 5-Year Quadrennial Defense Review Report (QDR) does address some of these changes in the short-term, it lacks the necessary vision to properly address these issues in the long-term. This paper will argue that without long-term strategies, DOD will be unprepared because the changes that will be required then need to start happening now. It will discuss these changes and trends and recommend strategies that DOD must adopt to remain a relevant force in our nation's defense. Specifically, it will recommend that DOD must develop long-term strategies that focus on improving urban warfare capabilities, developing alternate energy sources, adapting to changes in technology, establishing better controls for doing business with commercial and non-governmental agencies, re-examining force structure and force structure policies, improving cultural awareness and interagency operations, bridging the gap between current and future professional development and improving civil-military operations.

Growth in Urban Population and Urban Warfare

By 2025 we can expect to see the world's population to grow from 6.5 to 7.9 billion people.³ The concern here is not with the actual growth itself, but rather where the growth is occurring. Most of the increase in population will occur in urban areas. By the year 2025, nearly 60 percent or some 3.9 billion people will live in cities or urban areas.⁴ This is a concern because urban areas can generate a number of security threats. As Dr. Larry Goodson from the U.S. Army War College explains, in the case of the Middle East for example, a large youth surge, rapid increases in the labor force, high and rising unemployment and stagnant real

wages, and rapid urbanization are all contributing to dissatisfaction among the populous and thus could create fertile ground for recruiting terrorists.⁵

Urban centers also foster the growth of terrorist movements because of their physical characteristics. Dr. Max Manwaring of the Strategic Studies Institute refers to urban space as areas “where the people are” and theoretically impregnable as rural forest, jungles or mountains. Using the example of insurgent activity in Argentina of the 60’s and 70’s which sprang from urban areas, he emphasizes that people relocate to these urban areas to escape isolation, squalor and hopelessness and that these urban environments are very difficult for security forces to enter and much less control.⁶ This trend in urban violence, not unlike what we see today in Bagdad, has serious impact for future military operations, whether they are phase III or phase IV operations. Unfortunately, although the 2005 National Defense Strategy mentions irregular challenges that will essentially come from unconventional measures like terrorism and insurgencies,⁷ it does not discuss the issue of population growth, urbanization or the increased likelihood of urban warfare as a result of population growth and terrorist attraction to these areas. Fortunately, the National Military Strategy (NMS) does provide guidance, but only in a limited fashion.⁸ The NMS only states that the United States will conduct operations in diverse locations and from densely populated urban areas located in littoral regions to remote, inhospitable and austere locations but does not offer any recommendations of what DOD should be doing in the long-term to improve urban operations. For example, there is no mention of improving training facilities, developing additional skills or integrating civilian expertise into the urban warfare training process.

Becoming proficient in conducting operations in urban centers is essential if DOD is to remain relevant in the future. As Lieutenant Colonel Louis Dimarco, a veteran of Operation Iraqi Freedom suggest, it is impossible to conduct military operations in a particular country without being engaged within its cities and understanding the physical infrastructure of support systems and the urban population and its associated social, religious, cultural, diplomatic and economic characteristics.⁹ Lieutenant Colonel Stephen R. Dalzell, a Senior Service Fellow at Tufts University argues that past U.S. training for urban operations have been based on the assumption that urban operations would resemble European cities where you have large buildings, extensive road networks and existing infrastructure.¹⁰ However, this is not the case. New battlefields will be slum-like areas with substandard physical conditions and poorly or illegally built structures that are not part of conventional economic structures.¹¹ This implies that DOD must maintain skills like civil-affairs, physiological operations and regional linguists so that

they can be rapidly integrated into operations and deal with these types of environments if needed.¹²

This shift in demographics and importance of urbanization will require DOD to refocus its areas of jurisdiction from the traditional linear battlefield to an urban battlefield. As Major Kelly Houlgate, a Marine officer assigned to the Marine Corps' Strategic Initiatives Group in Plans, Policy & Operations suggest, DOD needs to shift more resources to urban warfare planning and training as well as research the possibility of having a separate Military Occupational Specialty for urban warfare.¹³ DOD should build a National Urban Training Center similar to the Army National Training Center that integrates the expertise of other government agencies, such as the Department of State (DOS) and United States Agency for International Development with the objective of training our soldiers and civilians on the full spectrum of problems that might be encountered in urban military operations to include problems related to diplomacy, culture, religion, and economics. While each service has their own training centers, there needs to be a National Training Center so that all training is consistent with the most current tactics, techniques and procedures.

Increased Competition for Scarce Resources

There are three major resources that DOD and the world should be concerned about. These resources include water, food and energy. Although water and food are important resources that must be carefully considered when the DOD looks at its long-term strategy, the resource of energy is the one that warrants the most attention. By 2025, OPEC will account for more than 50 percent of the world's oil supply and the skyrocketing demand for oil to fuel growing economies and increased numbers of cars will be a major concern, particularly in China.¹⁴ For example, Goldman Sachs estimates that by 2050, the number of automobiles in China could rise from 12 million to 500 million and in India from 5 million to 600 million.¹⁵

Greater demand elsewhere may mean less for the U.S and a requirement to prioritize between the needs of our economy and defense. Therefore, DOD needs to work hard to develop alternate sources of energy such as hydrogen, electricity and even nuclear energy. Some may argue that hydrogen as a source energy should not be pursued because of the projected shortage of water, however, it is safe to say that water will be a source available much longer than oil. In his 2006 State of the Union address, President George W. Bush stressed the need to move to electric and hydrogen based fuel systems. He stated that we will increase our research in better batteries for hybrid and electric cars and in pollution-free cars that run on

hydrogen.¹⁶ If the nation is moving toward these alternate energy sources, should DOD not move in that direction as well?

Faced with the certainty that hydrocarbons will become more and more scarce, DOD needs to invest more in Research and Development (R&D) of alternate fuel sources. Unfortunately, DOD actually plans to cut Science and Technology funding that includes research for alternate fuel sources. According to the 2007 DOD Budget, R&D will be cut from \$3.1 billion in 2006 to \$1.7 billion in 2007.¹⁷ In 2008, the program will receive a further 20 % cut.¹⁸ A stronger financial commitment and long-term view are needed from DOD in the area of R&D, particularly as it relates to alternate fuel sources.

Exponential Growth in Technology and Information

In June 2005, IBM developed computers capable of 280 trillion calculations per second, making them the most powerful supercomputers in the world.¹⁹ In addition to increased computing power, the means to transmit information will also increase exponentially. As Nicholas Negroponte from the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) noted “a fiber the size of a human hair can deliver every issue of the Wall Street Journal ever made in less than a second.²⁰ With wireless laptops, satellite communications, global navigation systems and other communication devices, information is becoming more easily accessible to everyone, even for terrorists. Other fields like Genetics, Biotechnology and Nanotechnology are also moving ahead at exponential speeds.

Nanotechnology is the engineering of functional systems at the molecular scale. China, one of the fastest growing economies in the world, places nanotechnology as one of its highest priorities in technology acquisition.²¹ According to M.C. Roco, Senior Advisor on Nanotechnology at the National Science Foundation, the annual production of nanotech sectors is expected to exceed 1 trillion 10 to 15 years from now. This growth will require 2 million nanotechnology workers.²² This means that the civilian manufacturing sector is gearing up for a huge nanotechnology market in the future. Nanotechnology has several applications for DOD, to include improving the battlefield survivability of our soldiers. For example, MIT is currently using nanotechnology to develop smart materials that can sense and detect chemical or biological warfare agents. They are also developing bullet-proof materials and uniforms that have wound detection and treatment systems. They have materials that harden to provide an instant splint for a broken bone and materials with lighter, tougher, heat resistant properties that can be used in the design and construction of spacecraft and satellites. Although DOD's investment in nanotechnology increased from \$70 million to \$436 million from 2001 to 2006,²³ it

decreased to \$345 million in the 2007.²⁴ DOD must maintain a consistent increased investment in nanotechnology if it is to stay current and competitive in this area and be able to reap the full benefits of this emerging technology when it comes to maturity in 10 to 20 years.

Advanced technologies also bring with them some vulnerability. According to the General Accounting Office (GAO), there are 120 countries or groups developing information warfare systems. In addition to the 30,000 hacker-oriented sites, cyber-warfare will constitute a major threat to the U.S. in the future.²⁵ We are living in a rapidly changing information age and DOD must adapt legacy systems to those that are more current and that can provide the real time information that can be used to provide intelligence that will enhance the security and operational effectiveness of our military units. Sue Payton, a writer for Military Information Technology magazine asserts that in order to wage and defend against information-age warfare, DOD must revamp its business processes to allow it to upgrade its systems faster than its adversaries. However, she believes this to be an almost impossible task because DOD's relies on software that is bound up in proprietary systems. These systems and software cannot be accessed or modified by anyone but the original vendor, even though DOD has rights to millions of lines of code that have cost billions of dollars to develop.²⁶ Therefore a key part of DOD's long-term strategy must be to eliminate the restrictions on proprietary systems so that it can keep pace with change it technology.

Lastly, there needs to be a single agency in our government responsible for technology and information operations. For example, while DOS is in charge of Diplomacy, DOD handles Defense, and the Department of Treasury (DOT) controls finance, there is no single federal agency that manages technology and information operations. Because information is one of our national elements of power, DOD's long-term strategy must be to push the administration and Congress to establish a Department of Information and Technology. This will create one single agency that can coordinate information operations and technology issues across the full spectrum of our government and provide DOD with the latest developments in this area.

Growing Influence of Commercial and NGOs

Commercial and non-governmental organizations (NGO's) are becoming more and more influential in world affairs while national and international government organizations are struggling to keep pace with the rapid changes occurring in the world. These private sector organizations are filling gaps in social services, politics, economics and even defense.²⁷ The United Nations Human Development Report counted 37000 registered NGOs in 2000 and those are expected to continue to grow in the years to come.²⁸ Corporations and NGO's are not only

driving how the economies are shaped, but also provide vital support to the DOD. Halliburton for example, is a major player in providing logistical support to U.S. operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. Representative Henry Waxman stated that as of December 2004, the value of Halliburton's Iraq contracts with DOD exceeded the \$10 billion threshold.²⁹ There are also companies that specialize in security operations. Blackwater USA for example provides not only private security but also professional military law enforcement, security, peacekeeping, and stability operations support as well.³⁰ Blackwater USA is also supporting DOD operations in Iraq.

NGO contributions do not have to be limited to in-theater operations. They can also be active partners in protecting our sea lines of communications, a security interest which will be a major future challenge. More than half of all Americans live near a coast and ninety-five percent of all our exports travel by water and according to the U.S. Navy, that volume is expected to double by 2020.³¹ In 2004, the U.S imported over \$1.4 trillion worth of goods and exported nearly \$820 billion.³² These waterways and the ships that carry goods to countries worldwide will become attractive targets to terrorists and the American people expect DOD to protect these vital elements of trade, not to mention their safety and own freedom of movement among the waterways.³³ In fact, while the U.S. Navy is recommending a 1,000 ship Navy to counter global terrorism and provide for the security of our waterways, it will require a long-term strategy that talks to the integration of commercial maritime capability as well as military naval capability.³⁴

If integrating these commercial companies into the overall long-term defense strategy is crucial, DOD's long-term strategy in this regard must also address the need to develop a system that will better control the acquisition, contracting and financial management processes associated with doing business with commercial partners. For example, the Pentagon Inspector General (IG) reported that while DOD contracted over \$140 billion in services with commercial companies in 2005, it unnecessarily spent money to other federal agencies to service these contracts, a task it could have done itself at a much lower cost. The IG also found that these other federal agencies did not follow proper procurement and financial management laws and rules.³⁵ Also, recent Congressional hearings regarding \$9 billion missing in Iraq brought to light the lack of reliability of DOD's contracting and financial management systems when contracting with commercial companies.³⁶ In fact, Congress calls the DOD acquisition process "broke" and expresses concern in the areas of requirements generation, acquisition and contracting and financial management.³⁷ As DOD continues to use commercial companies and monies become scarcer, Congress will put more scrutiny on the acquisition, contracting, and financial management processes associated with doing business with commercial companies. Therefore DOD's long-term strategy must be to institute procedures that build better controls to reduce

costs, eliminate fraud, waste and abuse and ensure full compliance with all acquisition, contracting and fiscal laws. DOD should establish a Director of Business Operations (DBO) directly under the SECDEF, charged with the responsibility of monitoring these processes. The DBO would also work to ensure that day-to-day operations of the department are run in the most efficient and cost effective manner.

Increase in World Conflicts and its impact on DOD

According to CSIS, future conflicts will not only differ in their basic nature but will also be more frequent.³⁸ This will require DOD to have forces capable of deploying worldwide with speed, agility and lethality to fight any kind of war. Former Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld put it best when he said, “while we can’t know for certain what kind of wars we might fight, we know what our priorities must be and they include preparing for unforeseen eventualities that range from full scale combat operations to counterinsurgency missions, stability operations and homeland defense.”³⁹ Not unlike what we see today, this will put evermore pressure on the U.S. armed services.

To do what Secretary Rumsfeld suggests, we must have the right force structure in place and the right policies to govern how that force structure is managed. As former Army Chief of Staff General Eric Shinseki warned, “Beware of the 12-division strategy for a 10-division Army.”⁴⁰ General Peter Schoomaker, the current Army Chief of Staff, also called for an immediate increase to the Army from 482K to 512K troops and with an additional 7K troops per year after that.⁴¹ Although DOD has asked for an increase of 90K soldiers over the next 5 years, the long-term DOD strategy must be to determine if this increase is enough and what the right force mix should be. This force structure increase must have the right mix of skills to include combat support, combat service support and specialties that are more and more in demand like civil affairs, special forces, and psychological operations. The 2006 GAO Report to Congress on force structure acknowledged that while the QDR did recognize the need to rebalance the force with the right mix of skills, it did not provide any details on how it would be accomplished.⁴² Given the time required to conceptualize, test, acquire and field forces, a QDR 5-year plan is not long term enough.

DOD must also look at its long-term policies regarding how the force is deployed. The Army Force Generation Model (ARFORGEN) for example states that active duty units will have a 3 year cycle that includes a maximum of a one-year deployment within that 3 year dwell time period (1:3).⁴³ However, this model is not working. The actual dwell time for an active duty brigade is less than 1 year.⁴⁴ In addition, there are over 263,000 of the 1,008,000 soldiers in

the Army inventory currently deployed.⁴⁵ With the potential for other crises to emerge in other parts of the world like Africa and the Middle East (with Iran), the ARFORGEN model may need to be adjusted or more troops may need to be brought into the DOD inventory. Finally, DOD needs to revisit the long-term policies associated with mobilizing and deploying reserve component soldiers. The current policy says that a reservist can only be mobilized once and for no more than 24 months.⁴⁶ As a result, out of 522K reserve (RC) and National Guard (NG) soldiers, only 90K is available for mobilization based on this policy. The September 2006 GAO Report to Congress on force structure also raised this as an issue of concern.⁴⁷

As mentioned earlier, the nature of future conflict will likely be different. As with the current Global War on Terrorism, if DOD is to become effective at combating unconventional enemies, it must ensure its force understands what motivates their actions. A large part of this motivation is centered on their cultural and religious beliefs. Shumel Bar, a writer for the Hoover Institution states that “the lion’s share of terrorist acts and the most devastating of them in recent years have been perpetrated in the name of Islam.”⁴⁸ Martin Van Creveld also asserts one of the key reasons people go to war is because of their religious beliefs.⁴⁹ Nothing indicates that this trend will cease or diminish. Hence, DOD must begin to understand how religion and culture motivate actions, particularly those of terrorist organizations.

Building a more cultural savvy military must be a long-term objective beyond the QDR. DOD must institute cultural awareness training for officers and NCOs at all mandatory as well as competitively selected schools. Also, not unlike annual refresher training for sexual harassment and equal opportunity employment, annual refresher training focused on countries like Iran, Iraq, North Korea and China must be institutionalized. A stronger fiscal investment for cultural awareness training is also needed. The 2007 DOD budget allocates \$180 million of a \$491 billion budget to irregular warfare operations which includes cultural awareness training. However, the \$180 million is currently planned to decrease to \$145 million per year from 2008 through 2011.⁵⁰ This is an example of what can happen without a proper strategy. What makes matters worst is that unfortunately, as mentioned earlier, becoming culturally aware is not a task that can be accomplished overnight. Therefore there is a need for a long term strategy that will steer officer and enlisted members’ professional development along that path.

The long-term path must teach junior officers and NCOs to think more strategically. They are being required to act not only as soldiers, but as diplomats, civil affairs experts and much more. This is the case in Iraq now and will continue to be the case in the future as we engage in conflicts characterized by asymmetrical warfare. A 2005 report of Army Transformation Hearings, the House Armed Services Committee acknowledged the need for continued

decentralization of decision making to the lower ranks. It stated the level of responsibility from critical decision-making in the services continues to drift downward. “Today sergeants make strategic decisions that only a decade ago were reserved for officers of very senior grade.”⁵¹

Jeffery McCausland former Dean of Academics at the U.S. Army War College and Gregg Martin a former instructor at the U.S. Army War College, state that in the future, our young officers will likely be confronted with situations that have strategic consequences and therefore must be trained to think strategically.⁵² They suggest that at the entry level, officers should be exposed to and understand our National Security and National Military Strategies so that when they make decisions, they understand the strategic impact of those decisions. This same type of strategic focus should continue at Combined Service and Staff College, Command and General Staff College, Unit Individual and Officer Professional Development and Senior Service College. McCausland and Martin even recommend that during the officer pre-commissioning process, officers should be encouraged to take courses in history, international and American politics, economics, philosophy, culture, and regional geography.⁵³

Thus, DOD’s long-term strategies must include an element that speaks to the future professional development need of its officers and NCOs. DOD must restructure its professional development program to train junior officers and NCOs (at the entry level) to think strategically and focus on skills other than military to include national strategy, history, religion, diplomacy, economics, culture and also the roles that international organizations like the United Nations play in conflict resolution. This training should be formally built into the curriculums at all officer and NCO mandatory and competitively selected leadership schools.

If there is one thing that future trends in conflict tells us is that even the best trained and culturally aware military will not be able to win without the assistance of the interagency. This is an issue that has and will continue to plague DOD’s effort in peace and wartime. General Anthony Zinni, former U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) Commander noted that when he took command of CENTCOM, he found a tremendous void in the diplomacy in his area of operations. In his mind, it was important, to develop close coordination between our diplomats and soldiers in order to effectively carry out military and post-military missions.⁵⁴ Zinni further stated that the “uncoordinated funding, policy decisions, authority, assigned geography and many other government agencies made it difficult to pull together complex engagement plans”.⁵⁵ Zinni’s comments seem to indicate a lack of real teamwork between other government agencies and DOD, particularly the Department of State (DOS). Gabriel Marcella, a faculty member at the US Army War College, and Fred Woerner, a retired general officer, noted that we are strategically impaired and not using all our diplomatic and informational tools to help solve

problems. They imply that DOD is often given missions that are best suited and performed by other agencies like the DOS and USAID.

Clark Murdock, a senior advisor at the Center for Strategic and International Studies and Richard Weitz, Associate Director of the Center for Future Security Studies at the Hudson Institute state that “weaknesses in other federal agencies have forced DOD to bear the main burden of nation building and … it is an imperative to expand and enhance civilian capacities to conduct complex contingency operations.”⁵⁶ One of those weaknesses is the lack of resources allotted to these other members of the interagency. For example, DOS funding has been reduced over the last three fiscal years from \$7.5 to \$7.1 billion.⁵⁷ Murdock and Weitz suggest that Congress must establish a new Agency for Stability Operations, where a Civilian Operation Corps and Reserve would field, train and equip for stability operations.⁵⁸ They also recommend that a new training center be established for Interagency and Coalition Operations that would be jointly run by DOD’s National Defense University and DOS’s National Foreign Affairs Center.⁵⁹

While not all of these issues are within DOD’s ability to fix, it can give itself a strategy to gradually take the necessary steps to eliminate the barriers impeding the interagency. Although the QDR does recommend the creation of National Security Planning Guidance to direct the development of both military and non-military plans and institutions, it does not make it clear who will be in charge and what authority and resources will be made available to improve interagency operations. During Secretary of Defense Robert Gate’s testimony to the Senate Arms Services Committee on the 2008 DOD Budget, the topic of better interagency support was discussed. Senator Warner indicated that a bill had been introduced and passed that laid the ground work for better interagency support.⁶⁰ DOD should review this bill and use it as a basis for working with the Congress and the Executive branch to designate a separate agency with the authority and resources to fully implement and improve interagency operations. DOD should also work to make it mandatory for officers and key civilians of other government agencies to do exchange tours within departments to enhance and improve the planning process for future combat and stability operations, similar to what Goldwater Nichols did for joint assignments for officers.

This need for better cooperation among the different actors also applies to civil-military relations. Military officers have an obligation to do no harm to the state’s democratic institutions, but do have an obligation to advise the nation’s civilian leadership on the proper use of military power. This relationship between senior military and civilian leaders will become increasingly important as we fight the war on terror and similar conflicts in the future. Recent experience seems to suggest that this important relationship may be in jeopardy. For example, former

Army Chief of Staff General Eric Shinseki's congressional testimony indicating a need for over 250,000 troops to perform stabilization operations in Iraq was not received very well by the senior civilian leadership in DOD. General Shinseki's testimony was not a violation of his responsibility to the constitution, but rather an example of how the process should work. In fact, General Shinseki's estimates were about right based on what we currently have in Iraq right now. Noted author Ralph Peters suggest that the new Secretary of Defense, Robert Gates must make rebuilding morale and trust between the DOD civilian leadership and senior military officers in the Pentagon a top priority, as well as ensuring that officers who are promoted to the flag rank have the right war-fighting skills to do the job and are not just promoted based on their abilities to "play well with others."⁶¹

In addition to improving civil-military relationships between senior military leaders and senior civilian leaders who are appointed from outside DOD, like the SECDEF, DOD must also improve civil-military relationships involving civilians who grow up internal to the DOD system. A long-term DOD goal should be to make these civilian leader developmental processes more in line with how military leaders are developed. This would greatly improve civil-military relationships. In 2001, the Army Chief of Staff directed a panel study on this very topic.⁶² The study concluded that the Army had fallen short in developing its civilian leaders and recommended four basic imperatives for developing civilian leaders. Those imperatives include; (1) tying personal and professional job performance together, and evaluating their effectiveness; (2) revamping career management with "gates" for progression, and build an all-encompassing Army Education System; (3) acknowledging that interpersonal skills are pivotal to leader competence and teaching and selecting leaders that exhibit them; and (4) integrating civilians fully into the Army culture – mentally, physically and emotionally – recognizing differences but embracing commitment to our national defense mission. All these imperatives are mandatory for military leaders and if DOD adopts a long term-strategy that incorporates these imperatives in the civilian professional and leader development, then civil-military relationships would be improved.

Finally, our senior military leaders must become savvier in how they deal with Congress. The Military Officers Association of America recently noted that only 24% of Congress has military experience and that this percentage has steadily decreased from 1991 to 2007.⁶³ In 1991, 68% of Senators and 48% of Congressman had military experience, compared to 29% and 23% respectively in 2007. Senior military leaders must be able to explain complex military operations and procedures in terms that Congressmen with limited military experience can understand. They also need to have a firm grasp of the competing priorities facing our nation

and Congress and understand how military and defense spending affects other programs that are of interest to the nation and Congress, such as Medicare, Social security, etc. The long-term strategy for DOD is to develop a training program for senior military leaders designed to help improve dialogue with Congress. A good idea is to have former Congressmen come in and talk to these senior leaders on what Congress expects when they dialogue and discuss military issues. The training should be built into the curriculum of the National Defense University.

Summary

DOD will face many challenges in the future. One of these challenges is to develop long-term strategies beyond the QDR that address long-term changes taking place in the world such as increased population growth and urbanization, rapid changes in technology, shortages of natural resources, greater influence by commercial and non-governmental organizations in the defense and security sector, and an increase in and change in the nature of conflicts. To face these changes, DOD must develop long-term strategies that focus on improving urban warfare capabilities, developing alternate energy sources, adapting to changes in technology, improving the integration as well as accountability of commercial and non-governmental agencies, improving force structure, improving interagency operations, bridging the gap in officer and NCO professional development and improving civil-military operations. Specifically, DOD's long-term strategy to meet the challenges of 2020 and beyond should focus on the following things:

- Creating a separate MOS for urban warfare and designing a National Urban Warfare Training Center that trains soldiers from all services as well as key civilians on the latest doctrine associated with urban warfare. This training center should integrate expertise from other government agencies, particularly in the areas of politics, diplomacy, economics and culture as they effect of urban operations;
- Investing more in Science and Technology R&D with the goal of developing hydrogen, electric or nuclear based energy sources; eliminating restrictions on propriety systems that prevent the flexibility to adapt to rapid changes in new systems technology, making R&D investment in nanotechnology a top priority, while looking long-term at the environmental and health risks associated with nanotechnology and pushing the administration to establish a separate agency that oversees information technology and information operations for the US government.
- Partnering more with commercial and allied maritime organizations to help protect sea LOCs and establishing a DOD Director of Business Operations with the focus on eliminating fraud waste and abuse and improving procurement, contracting and

financial management processes associated with doing business with commercial companies.

- Developing the right force mix based on the future asymmetrical threat and focus on combat support and service support personnel as well as specialty skills such as civil affairs, psychological operations and Special Forces that are becoming more in demand as a result of asymmetrical warfare and urban operations. Change the policies regarding how long soldiers can be deployed as well as the statutory restrictions associated with deploying reserve component soldiers.
- Bridging the current gap between current and future professional development by incorporating cultural awareness (religious, diplomatic, informational, military, economic, and financial) training into all mandatory and competitively selected schools for officers and NCOs and make it mandatory annual refresher training just like sexual harassment and equal opportunity training. Focus on countries that pose a potential threat to our nation like North Korea, Iran, and China. Train our junior officers and non-commissioned officers to think strategically by giving early exposure to NSS and NMS and focusing on the full spectrum of elements of national power as well as international disciplines.
- Improving the interagency process by establish a training center jointly run by DOD's National Defense University and DOS's National Foreign Affairs Center that focuses on training civilians to play a greater role in military operations, particularly post-stabilization operations. Review current congressional interagency support legislation and use it as a basis for obtaining Executive branch support for creating an agency with both the authority and resources to oversee and improve interagency operations. Work with the administration and Congress to pass laws making it mandatory for officers and key civilians to perform mandatory exchange tours to improve the planning process for future combat operations.
- Improving civil-military relations, by developing a training and leader development program for its civilians similar to that of its military leaders. Senior military officers must also become savvier in how they deal with Congress. DOD should develop a training program at the National Defense University that trains senior military leaders on how to better dialogue with Congress.

Endnotes

¹ Stephen A. Shambach, ed., *Strategic Leadership Primer*, 2nd Ed, (Carlisle, PA: United States Army War College, 2004), 50.

² Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), "The Seven Revolutions of Change," available from http://7revs.csis.org/sevenrevs_content.html; Internet; accessed 12 November 2006.

³ Ibid.

⁴ Ibid.

⁵ Larry P. Goodson, "Things Change and Things Stay the Same: New Realities and Underlying Constants in the Middle East", lecture paper, U.S. Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, PA, 2006.

⁶ Max G. Manwaring, "Shadows of Things Past and Images of the Future; Lessons for the Insurgencies in our Midst", November 2004; available from <http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdffiles/PUB587.pdf#search=%22montonero%20insurgency%22>; Internet; accessed 24 February 2007.

⁷ Donald H. Rumsfeld, *The National Defense Strategy of the United States of America* (Arlington, VA: The Pentagon, March 2005), 3.

⁸ Richard B. Myers, *National Military Strategy of the United States of America, A Strategy for Today; A Vision for Tomorrow* (Arlington, VA: The Pentagon, 2004), 5.

⁹ Lieutenant Colonel Louis A. Dimarco, *Traditions, Changes and Challenges: Military Operations and the Middle Eastern City*, (Fort Leavenworth, KS: Combined Studies Institute Press, 2004), 59.

¹⁰ Stephen R. Dalzell, "Where the Streets Have No Names: Looking Past Operation Iraqi Freedom to Future Urban Operations," *Joint Force Quarterly* (No. 43, 4th Quarter 2006): 41.

¹¹ Ibid.

¹² Ibid.

¹³ Kelly Houlgate, The Naval Institute: Proceedings: Urban Warfare Transforms the Corps, available from http://www.military.com/NewContent/0,13190,NI_1104_Urban-P2,00.html; Internet; accessed 30 January 2007.

¹⁴ CSIS.

¹⁵ CSIS.

¹⁶ George W. Bush, "President George W. Bush's Address Before A Joint Session Of The Congress On The State of the Union," 31 January 2006; available from http://www.c-span.org/executive/transcript.asp?cat=current_event&code=bush_admin&year=2006; Internet; accessed 5 December 2006.

¹⁷ Association of the United States Army, *Fiscal Year 2007 Army Budget An Analysis* (Arlington, VA Institute of Land Warfare), 63.

¹⁸ Kevin Bullis, "White House Budget to Cut Energy Research," 9 February 2007; available from <http://www.technologyreview.com/Energy/18157/>; Internet; accessed 21 February 2007.

¹⁹ TOP 500 Super Computer Sites , SC06, November 2006, available from <http://www.top500.org/lists/2006/11>; Internet; accessed 2 December 2006.

²⁰ Nicholas Negroponte, *Being Digital*, (New York: Random House, Inc), 1995.

²¹ Department of Defense, *Annual Report to Congress, Military Power of the People's Republic of China* (Arlington, VA: Office of the Secretary of Defense, 2005), 23.

²² Dr M.C. Roco, "National Nanotechnology Initiative and Global Perspective, 19 March 2002, available from at http://www.nano.gov/html/res/smwonder_slide.pdf; Internet; accessed 25 February 2007.

²³ Michael Berger, "Military Nanotechnology - How Worried Should We Be?," 13 November 2006; available from <http://www.nanowerk.com/spotlight/spotid=1015.php>; Internet; accessed 21 February 2007.

²⁴ D.C. Roco, "AAAS Report XXXI: Research and Development FY 2007, National Nanotechnology Investment in the FY 2007 Budget Request, available from <http://www.aaas.org/spp/rd/07pch24.htm>; Internet; accessed 21 February 2007.

²⁵ John Christensen, "Bracing for Guerrilla Warfare in Cyberspace," 6 April 1999; available from <http://www.cnn.com/TECH/specials/hackers/cyberterror/>; Internet; accessed 25 February 2007.

²⁶ Sue Payton, "Write as We Fight"; 14 August 2006; available from <http://www.military-information-technology.com/article.cfm?DocID=1589>; Internet; accessed 9 December 2006.

²⁷ CSIS.

²⁸ Ibid.

²⁹ Henry Waxman, "Truth Out Issues, Fact Sheet Halliburton's Iraq Contracts Now Worth over \$10 Billion," 9 December 2004; available from http://www.truthout.org/docs_04/121004A.shtml; Internet; accessed 10 December 2006.

³⁰ *Blackwater USA Homepage*, available from <http://www.blackwaterusa.com/about/>; Internet; accessed 12 December 2006.

³¹ Mike Mullen, "What I believe: Eight Tenets that Guide My Vision for the 21st Century Navy," *Proceedings* (January 2006): 13.

³² Ibid.

³³ Ibid.

³⁴ John Morgan and Charles Martoglio, "The 1,000 Ship Navy: Global Maritime Network," *Proceedings* (30 November 2005): 15.

³⁵ William Matthews, "Pentagon IG: Procurement Laws are Routinely Broken," *World News*, 22 January 2007, p. 4.

³⁶ Helen Thomas, "\$9B Goes Missing in Iraq, Huge Sums Disappear Without a Trace," 25 February 2005; available from <http://www.commondreams.org/views05/0225-26.htm>; Internet; accessed 7 February 2006.

³⁷ U.S. Congress, House of Representatives, Committee on Armed Services, *National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2007*, Report of the Committee on Armed Services House of Representatives on H.R. 5122, 109th Congress., 2d sess, 5 May 2005, 350.

³⁸ CSIS.

³⁹ Association of the United States Army (AUSA), *Torchbearer National Security Report, 2006 and Beyond: What the Army is Doing* (Arlington VA: Institute of Land Warfare, March 2006), 5.

⁴⁰ David T. Pyne, "Iraq War Stretching US Army to Breaking Point," 24 October 2003; available from <http://www.intellectualconservative.com/article2782.html>; accessed 12 December 2006.

⁴¹ Ann Scott Tyson, "General Says Army Will Need to Grow," *Washington Post*, 15 December 2006, p. 1.

⁴² U.S. General Accounting Office, *Report to Congressional Committees, Force Structure; DOD Needs to Integrate Data Into Its Force Identification Process and Examine Options to Meet Requirements for High-Demand Support Forces* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. General Accounting Office, September 2006), 2.

⁴³ AUSA, 16.

⁴⁴ Peter Schoomaker, "Statement by General Peter Schoomaker, Chief of Staff United States Army, before Commission on National Guard and Reserves," 14 December 2006; available from <http://www.army.mil/-speeches/2006/12/14/989-statement-by-general-peter-schoomaker-chief-of-staff-united-states-army-before-the-commission-on-national-guard-and-reserves/>; Internet; accessed 7 March 2007.

⁴⁵ AUSA, 5.

⁴⁶ Tyson.

⁴⁷ U.S. General Accounting Office, 2. "The number of reserve personnel that can be deployed under current mobilization authorities and deployment policies is declining and many personnel have been moved among units to tailor forces and fill shortages in those units."

⁴⁸ Schumel Bar, "The Religious Source of Islamic Terrorism, Internet," *Policy Review*, June/July 2004; available from <http://www.hoover.org/publications/policyreview/3438276.html>; Internet; accessed 30 January 2007.

⁴⁹ Martin Van Creveld, *The Transformation of War: What War is Fought For* (New York: Free Press, 1991), 134.

⁵⁰ Association of the United States Army, *Fiscal Year 2007 Army Budget An Analysis* (Arlington, VA Institute of Land Warfare), 23.

⁵¹ U.S. Congress, House, Committee on Armed Services Army Transformation Report: Hearing before the Committee on Armed Services, House of Representatives, p77, Internet, Accessed on 8 January 2007, E:\Army Transformation hearing before the___ - Google Book Search.htm

⁵² Jeffrey D. McCausland and Greg F. Martin, "Transforming Strategic Leader Education for the 21st Century," *Parameters* (Autumn 2001): 30-32.

⁵³ Ibid.

⁵⁴ Tony Zinni, "CENTCOM," Excerpts from Tom Clancy, with Tony Zinni and Tony Koltz, *Battle Ready* (New York: Putnam, 2004), in U.S. Army War College, *Implementing National Military Strategy, Volume 1 Selected Readings* (Carlisle Barracks: U.S. Army War College, 5 December 2006): 3-26 to 3-27.

⁵⁵ Ibid, 3-30.

⁵⁶ Clark A. Murdock and Richard W. Weitz, "Beyond Goldwater-Nichols: New Proposals for Defense Reform," *Joint Force Quarterly* (Issue 38): 39.

⁵⁷ *Office of Management and Budget Homepage*, available from <http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/budget/fy2008/appendix.html>; Internet; accessed 25 February 2007.

⁵⁸ Clark A. Murdock and Richard W. Weitz, 40.

⁵⁹ Ibid.

⁶⁰ Senate Armed Services Committee on 2008 Defense Budget, Secretary Gates, General Pace and Tina Jonas testify about the proposed fiscal year 2008 budget for the Department of Defense and the 2007-2008 War Supplemental Request. 2/6/2007: WASHINGTON, DC: 3 hr. 57 min.

⁶¹ Ralph Peters, "Letter to the New Secretary," *Armed Forces Journal* (December 2006): 14-15.

⁶² PERMISS, "Army Training and Leader Development - Civilian Implementation Plan (ATLD-CIV)," available from <http://cpol.army.mil/library/permis/75b.html>; Internet; accessed 21 February 2007.

⁶³ MOAA, "Declining Military Experience in Congress", available from <http://www.moaa.org/print.asp?pagename=about>; Internet; accessed 11 December 2006.